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Power and Law in Enlightened
Absolutism – Carl Gottlieb Svarez’
Theoretical and Practical Approach
Milan Kuhli
The term Enlightened Absolutism reﬂects a certain tension between its
two components. This tension is in a way a continuation of the dichotomy
between power on one hand and law on the other. The present paper shall
provide an analysis of these two concepts from the perspective of Carl Gott-
lieb Svarez, who, in his position as a high-ranking Prussian civil servant and
legal reformist, has had unparalleled inﬂuence on the legislative history of the
Prussian states towards the end of the 18th century. Working side-by-side
with Johann Heinrich Casimir von Carmer, who held the post of Prussian
minister of justice from 1779 to 1798, Svarez was able to make use of his
talent for reforming and legislating. From 1780 to 1794 he was primarily
responsible for the elaboration of the codiﬁcation of the Prussian private law
– the “Allgemeines Landrecht für die Preußischen Staaten” in 1794. In the
present paper, Svarez’ approach to the relation between law and power shall
be analysed on two diﬀerent levels. Firstly, on a theoretical level, the re-
formist’s thoughts and reﬂections as laid down in his numerous works, papers
and memorandums, shall be discussed. Secondly, on a practical level, the
question of the extent to which he implemented his ideas in Prussian legal
reality shall be explored.
1 Introduction
The term Enlightened Absolutism reﬂects a certain tension between its two components.
This tension is in a way a continuation of the dichotomy between power on one hand and
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law on the other. The present paper shall provide an analysis of these two concepts from
the perspective of Carl Gottlieb Svarez, who, in his position as a high-ranking Prussian
civil servant and legal reformist, has had unparalleled inﬂuence on the legislative history
of the Prussian states towards the end of the 18th century. Working side-by-side with
Johann Heinrich Casimir von Carmer, who held the posts of Silesian minister of justice
from 1768 to 1779 and Prussian minister of justice from 1779 to 1798, Svarez was able
to make use of his talent for reforming and legislating. From 1780 to 1794 he was
primarily responsible for the elaboration of the codiﬁcation of the Prussian private law –
the “Allgemeines Landrecht für die Preußischen Staaten” in 1794 (Allgemeines Landrecht
– ALR) and the corresponding draft entitled “Allgemeines Gesetzbuch für die Preußischen
Staaten” (Allgemeines Gesetzbuch – AGB) in 1791.
Carl Gottlieb Svarez was an advocate of the new school of natural law and thus con-
vinced of the possibility of every circumstance in life to be governed by rules. At the
same time, however, he felt deep loyalty towards the absolute monarch, which was not
only due to his position as civil servant. The tension between the law and the ruler’s
power entailed by these convictions shall be the topic of the present analysis. Svarez’
approach to the relation between law and power shall be analysed on two diﬀerent levels.
Firstly, on a theoretical level, the reformist’s thoughts and reﬂections as laid down in his
numerous works, papers and memorandums, shall be discussed (section B). Secondly, on
a practical level, the question of the extent to which he implemented his ideas in Prussian
legal reality shall be explored (section C).
2 Svarez’ theoretical concept of power and law
Svarez produced a wide range of theoretical material reaching from lectures to letters and
memorandums as well as papers directed at the general public. The following analysis of
his views on power and law shall be based mainly on the so-called Crown Prince Lectures.
These are lectures given by Svarez between 1792 and 1793 as an introduction to state
aﬀairs and jurisprudence for the crown prince, later King Frederick William III.1
2.1 The monarch’s obligations
The starting point for Svarez’ thoughts about power and law is the social contract which
he sees as the foundation of the state – a view that was widely shared among his con-
temporaries. According to him, the regent installed by the social contract has the task
of governing his subjects according to the law and for the purpose of the state (Staats-
zweck).2 The subjects in turn pledge to obey their regent in accordance with the law.3
Since the actions of the regent are informed by the purpose of the state the idea of the
1 Kuhli (2012) 23 et seq.
2 Svarez, Crown Prince Lectures, in: Conrad/Kleinheyer (1960) 582.
3 Ibid. 7. – See Boeck (1966) 61-62.
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social contract – as seen by Svarez – blends in with the Enlightened Absolutism of the
18th century.4
Svarez was convinced that the main purpose of the state derives from the juxtaposition
of civil society on one hand and the deﬁcits of the state of nature on the other hand.
In his opinion, the state is, on one hand, meant to protect each of its members against
any violent attack on their person and property perpetrated by a third party, and, on
the other hand, to promote collective happiness.5 This broad concept of the purpose of
the state goes beyond Rousseau’s idea of the state’s primary purpose being to guarantee
safety and peace.6 Interestingly, Svarez does not refer to any moral commitment to do
whatever will promote the happiness of fellow citizens as the underlying principle of the
extended purpose he sees for the state. He rather deduces that purpose directly from the
social contract.7
In his Crown Prince Lectures, Svarez asserts that no form of government has as many
visible advantages as monarchy.8 It has in some cases been concluded from this statement
that Svarez was a deﬁnite advocate of absolute monarchy and a deﬁnite opponent to any
form of constitutional arrangement.9 However, this opinion cannot be subscribed to that
easily. Instead, it has to be stressed that Svarez’ positive opinion on absolute monarchy
basically stems from a comparison of this form of government with other possibilities. It
is hence possible that Svarez did indeed hold a certain degree of mistrust against absolute
monarchy despite the fact that he witnessed the historic experience of the Enlightened
Absolutism of Frederick the Great.10
Consistent with the political theory of natural law, however, the fact that in absolute
monarchy the state authority resides solely with the monarch does not lead Svarez to the
conclusion that the monarch may act completely without bounds.11 Although it is true
that Svarez does not call for any restriction of the monarch’s power in terms of including
representatives of the people, the estates of the country or any other authority in the
government12, he does point out a number of obligations the monarch shall be subject to.
As mentioned above, he shall, for instance, pursue the purpose of the state,13 and hence
his action shall always be aimed at increasing general welfare.14 Apart from that, the
monarch’s power shall always be subject to the law15 – this principle was later enshrined
in § 22 of the ALR.
According to Svarez’ concept, the rule of law has many diﬀerent implications. For
4 See Reibstein (1962) 523 et seq.
5 Svarez, Crown Prince Lectures, in: Conrad/Kleinheyer (1960) 464. – See Stölzel (1885) 286; Wolf
(1963) 450-451.
6 Rousseau (2003) 16-17. – See Wolf (1963) 446-447.
7 Svarez, Lecture “Über den Zweck des Staats“, in: Conrad/Kleinheyer (1960) 642.
8 Svarez, Crown Prince Lectures, in: Conrad/Kleinheyer (1960) 475.
9 Hellmuth (1998) 75-76.
10 See Birtsch (1985) 95 et seq.
11 See Link (1998) 24-25.
12 Conrad (1958) 34.
13 See Conrad (1961) 20; Link (1998) 24-25.
14 Svarez, Crown Prince Lectures, in: Conrad/Kleinheyer (1960) 9.
15 Ibid. 246. – See Link (1986a) 792.
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example, it entails the prohibition of retroactivity so that legal rules must not be applied
to cases that took place before the respective rule was established.16 Even Svarez’ remarks
on so-called Machtsprüche (‘dictums’) can, to a certain extent, be deduced from the
principle of the rule of law.17 A Machtspruch consisted of an authoritative decision by
the monarch through which he could intervene in on-going judicial proceedings in civil
law matters either by giving a ruling himself or by instructing the court to come to a
certain decision.18 The term Machtspruch was used as of the end of the 17th century,
however, its ﬁrst component Macht (‘power’) did not refer to any violent act but merely
to the claim of exerting sovereign power.19 Svarez holds that Machtsprüche must not be
binding.20 As an explanation he refers to the need of protecting the Prussian subjects’
civil liberties.21 A Machtspruch issued by the monarch would endanger those liberties
since such a decision could well be wrong in substance. Svarez argues that a monarch
can neither be expected nor required to know the details of every single legal rule, and
that in addition to that, the monarch would be prevented from fully fulﬁlling his task as
governor if he were required to intervene in the civil justice system.22
2.2 No legal obligation on the monarch
The fact that, according to Svarez, the regent is subject to a number of obligations does
not necessarily indicate what normative eﬀect such bounds could have. In his works,
Svarez repeatedly creates the impression that no earthly authority could implement the
monarch’s obligations. Such an authority is certainly not meant to be a single judge –
Svarez deems a judge competent to judge over the regent only in certain areas such as
ﬁscal matters.23 Nor are the subjects meant to play the role of an authority charged
of supervising the implementation of the monarch’s obligations, according to Svarez,
and they certainly do not have the right to resist against acts by which the monarch
violates his obligations.24 In the light of such statements it is diﬃcult to understand
the reformist’s denial of any binding nature to acts through which the monarch violates
the obligations that derive from natural law – such as Machtsprüche.25 Aﬃrmations
such as the latter seem to justify resistance by the subjects, but Svarez does at no point
mention resistance as a valid consequence. The fact that certain acts at the hands of
the monarch may not be binding does not entail the subjects’ right to resist against that
act. Hence, the regent is subject to certain obligations, a violation of which does not
necessarily lead to any sanction.26 Svarez’ views on Machtsprüche can be referred to
16 Conrad (1958) 36 et seq.
17 Thieme (1965/66) 11.
18 See Svarez, Crown Prince Lectures, in: Conrad/Kleinheyer (1960) 236.
19 Bornhak (1903) 252; Finkenauer (1996) 101-102.
20 Svarez, Crown Prince Lectures, in: Conrad/Kleinheyer (1960) 236.
21 Ibid. 236 et seq., 616 et seq.; see Finkenauer (1996) 87 et seq.
22 Svarez, Crown Prince Lectures, in: Conrad/Kleinheyer (1960) 590.
23 See ibid. 132 et seq.
24 See Thieme (1937) 378; Hellmuth (1998) 70.
25 Svarez, Crown Prince Lectures, in: Conrad/Kleinheyer (1960) 236.
26 Link (1998) 24-25.
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once more in order to illustrate the separation between the non-binding nature of certain
acts and the (lack of a) right to resist by the subjects. On one hand, the reformist
stressed that Machtsprüche shall not be legally binding27 whilst on the other hand he
constantly insisted that the judge as well as the party to the proceedings who is aﬀected
by the Machtspruch are under the obligation to carry it out.28 Svarez’ strict distinction
between the non-binding nature of certain acts and the subjects’ duty to obey their
regent shows a striking similarity with Christian Wolﬀ’s ideas.29
For Svarez, the prohibition of resistance is a consequence of the social contract, ac-
cording to which, in his view, the right to decide whether a certain law is suitable and
applicable resides solely with the legislative authority. The subjects in turn have no right
to express their subjective view on the validity of a legal rule by refusing to obey the
monarch.30 They do, however, have the right to form and express their own opinion in
public as long as in doing so they do not compromise the peace and order of the state.31 If
Svarez’ concept does not include an external authority in charge of sanctioning violations
of natural law on the part of the regent, the only such authority must be the regent’s
common sense.32 The monarch’s reasonable actions in accordance with the purpose of
the state are what distinguishes Enlightened Absolute Monarchy from despotism.33 Ac-
cording to Svarez it is thus necessary to call upon the monarch’s common sense, and
hence it is interesting to consider how he intended to compensate for the fact that the
monarch’s obligations under natural law were not enforceable. This shall be done in the
following section.
2.3 Compensation for the lack of legal obligation
Svarez was aware of the fact that the monarch’s common sense was a feeble guarantee.34
His mistrust led him to invoke non-legal means of inciting the monarch to act reasonably.
For instance, his work contains numerous hints directed at the regent warning him to
apply his common sense for the sake of the political survival of his dynasty in power.35
For although Svarez rejected the idea of the subjects’ right to resist against acts of royal
power, he was well-aware of the actual possibility of single acts of resistance or even a
collective revolution.36 He even made use of this prospect when teaching the later King
27 Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz (Berlin), Hauptabteilung I, Repositur 84, Abteilung
XVI, number 7, vol. 80, folium 2v.
28 Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz (Berlin), Hauptabteilung I, Repositur 84, Abteilung
XVI, number 7, vol. 9, folium 168r.
29 Wolﬀ (1740-1748 / 1968), Pars VIII, Capitulum VI, § 1044-1045 (p. 818-819). – See Hellmuth (1998)
70; Hellmuth (1985) 54-55; Link (1986b) 184; Kuhli (2012) 89-90.
30 Svarez, Crown Prince Lectures, in: Conrad/Kleinheyer (1960) 586 et seq.
31 Ibid. 219.
32 Ibid. 458 et seq.
33 Conrad (1958) 35.
34 See Link (1998) 26.
35 Svarez, Crown Prince Lectures, in: Conrad/Kleinheyer (1960) 220. – See Thieme (1965/66) 11; Birtsch
(1985) 96.
36 Kuhli (2012) 91. – See Svarez, Crown Prince Lectures, in: Conrad/Kleinheyer (1960) 586.
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Frederick William III. in order to convince him of the necessity of observing the bounds
set to the ruling authority by natural law. It must be stressed though that Svarez merely
describes the possibilities of resistance and revolution – he does not deem them legally
acceptable nor does he advocate them in any way.
The hints at possible resistance and revolution must have impressed the later King
Frederick William III, but he was possibly even more impressed by his teacher’s references
to posterity forming its own judgement about former monarchs.37 Such arguments were
especially convincing to the crown prince since there were cases at the time in Prussia
where decisions made by a former monarch were revised by his successor on the Prussian
throne. In 1786, for instance, Frederick William II. gave order to rehabilitate several
high-ranking judges who had been punished by Frederick the Great for an alleged false
judgement.38 It is true that in doing so, Frederick William II. did not explicitly accuse
his predecessor personally of an incorrect decision – the nephew of Frederick the Great
did not call the admissibility of the decision made by his uncle into question but rather
claimed that the decision had been based on incorrect reports and thus brought about
surreptitiously.39 However, Frederick William II.’s action was a clear sign that decisions
made by a certain regent did not necessarily persist in the eyes of posterity. It was
the function of posterity as a judge of former monarchs that Svarez used as a means of
warning during the Crown Prince Lectures.
However, Svarez’ educational approach was not limited to his personal inﬂuence on
the future monarch during the Crown Prince Lectures. His eﬀorts are also visible in
that he advocated the idea of third persons acting as advisors to the monarch. Although
it is true that Svarez was against any model in which third persons would be granted
direct political participation in the monarch’s exercise of power on one hand, he did on
the other hand wish to give third persons the opportunity of assisting the monarch by
oﬀering him advice on his work. For example, this is true for the Prussian estates of the
country and the Gesetzkommission (‘law commission’), the working group in charge of
elaborating a new code of laws. In Svarez’ view, none of these institutions were meant to
obtain the right to participate directly in the Prussian legislative process40 – for instance
through the right of approval – but he repeatedly stresses the importance of the estates
of the country and the Gesetzkommission as an advisory body to the monarch.41
Svarez also believed that the subjects as a whole should fulﬁl an advisory function.
It is true that, just like the estates of the country and the Gesetzkommission, they
do not have a documented right to participate in the exertion of power.42 However,
Svarez accords them a decisive role in the formation of public opinion, which he believes
is not necessarily a top-down process, but should also work in the opposite direction.
This explains the reformist’s relatively moderate views on the freedom of press.43 In
37 Svarez, Crown Prince Lectures, in: Conrad/Kleinheyer (1960) 238.
38 See Krause (1998) 160-161.
39 Bornhak (1903) 268 et seq.
40 Svarez, Crown Prince Lectures, in: Conrad/Kleinheyer (1960) 16 et seq.
41 Ibid. 479.
42 See Koselleck (1981) 27.
43 For further information on Svarez’ views on censorship and the freedom of press see Kuhli (2012) 107
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addition to that, he called for legal rules to be formulated in a clear and coherent way
so as to give the individual subjects the possibility of being informed about the current
legal situation.44 From the information laid down so far, however, one cannot conclude
that Svarez’ theorems were indeed fully implemented in legal reality – especially in the
codiﬁcation of Prussian civil law. The question of the extent to which the reformist’s
views about the relation of power and law entered the AGB and the ALR shall be
discussed in the following section.
3 Practical implementation of Svarez’ reﬂections
The question about the extent to which Svarez’ theoretical views were actually imple-
mented cannot be answered without considering the ALR, in whose creation he played
a unique and decisive role. Although it is true that Carmer’s staﬀ responsible for the
codiﬁcation of the Prussian laws comprised several people, Svarez was the one who took
the lead.45 He was the one who drafted the ﬁrst version of the code of laws.46 He was
also the one who assessed the results of the participation of the general public in the
legislative procedure in his so-called revisio monitorum.47 The draft was then revised on
the basis of his assessment, ﬁnally resulting in the AGB. Even during the ﬁnal review
Svarez’ contribution was by far the largest.48
The following section shall oﬀer an introduction to the history of the creation of the
ALR (section I.). Thereafter, the actual question about the extent to which Svarez was
able to implement his ideas on power and law in the context of the judicial reform shall be
explored (section II.). Here, a distinction must be made between the concept underlying
the AGB (section II.1.) and that which was later adopted in the ALR after the ﬁnal
review which had been ordered by Frederick William II. (section II.2.).
3.1 The creation of the ALR
There are not many pieces of legislation whose creation was as long a process as that of
the ALR.49 Under the inﬂuence of natural law, the idea of codifying nearly all areas of
the subjects’ lives emerged in Prussia as early as the 17th century.50 What was called
for was a comprehensible and clearly structured code of laws that would be written in
simple language and be void of any type of academic discussion.51 Apart from that,
the new school of natural law, which developed in Germany from the mid 18th century
et seq.
44 Svarez, Crown Prince Lectures, in: Conrad/Kleinheyer (1960) 602. – See Thieme (1937) 369.
45 See Hintze (1915/1987) 397.
46 Hattenhauer (1996) 9; Hinschius (1889) 8.
47 Hinschius (1889) 8 et seq.
48 Schwennicke (1995) 86-87; Stölzel (1885) 394-395.
49 Conrad (1958) 12.
50 Schreiber (1976) 83; see Krause (1988) 21.
51 Conrad (1958) 10-11.
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on,52 began increasingly drawing on ancient German sources of law.53 The pursuit of
reforms in Prussia was further sustained by the wish to correct certain deﬁcits of the
legal system.54
Eﬀorts to create a new civil legislation as well as to improve Prussian legal proceedings
had already been made under Frederick I. and Frederick William I.55 However, for several
reasons, these basic approaches were just as fruitless as the attempts made by their
successor Frederick the Great together with the Prussian minister of justice Samuel von
Cocceji during the early years of the former’s reign.56 Cocceji’s successors to the post
of Prussian minister of justice, Philipp Joseph von Jariges and Carl Joseph Maximilian
von Fürst und Kupferberg, hardly made any eﬀort to revisit Cocceji’s reformist ideas.
During the Seven Years War from 1756 to 1763, which constituted an existential danger
to the Prussian state, such attempts would most likely have failed in any case.57
Reform eﬀorts were only resumed in 1780.58 Frederick the Great had increasingly been
faced with complaints about the slow march of the Prussian judiciary, so that the mistrust
he had always held in the legal profession turned into outright dissatisfaction.59 One
court case became a catalyst for the revival of eﬀorts to reform the judiciary: A case that
entered German legal history as the so-called Müller-Arnold-Prozess.60 By intervening in
this case, Frederick the Great caused a legal scandal. The monarch accused the respective
judges of having handed down a false judgement – wrongly as it later turned out – to
the detriment of a miller and in favour of a nobleman. Frederick II. saw this case as a
conﬁrmation of his mistrust of the Prussian judicial system and in late 1779 ordered the
dismissal and incarceration of several high-ranking judges as well as the removal of the
minister of justice Fürst und Kupferberg61 who was according to him responsible for the
state of the system.62 On 25 December 1779 Johann Heinrich Casimir von Carmer was
named the new minister of justice.63 Carmer seemed to the king to be suitable for the
post. On one hand he had already voiced several ideas for reforming legal proceedings
during the preceding years, and on the other hand he was no longer needed in his previous
position as Silesian minister of justice since he had already succeeded in regulating legal
matters in that province so that his talent for organising and legislating could now be
put to use for the whole state of Prussia.64
After appointing him, Frederick immediately instructed Carmer to correct the deﬁcits
of the legal system. He did not, however, at the time envisage a reform of procedural
52 Conrad, in: Conrad/Kleinheyer (1960) XI, XII.
53 Karst (2003) 183.
54 See Ogris (1987) 80; Dilthey (1960) 133.
55 Merten (1992) 32 et seq.; Thieme (1937) 361.
56 See Kuhli (2012) 122 et seq.
57 Geus (2002) 114.
58 Schreiber (1976) 86.
59 Hattenhauer (1996) 3. – See Barzen (1999) 17; Schmidt (1926) 23.
60 Köbler (1996) 140; Benthaus (1996) 46.
61 Hattenhauer (1996) 4.
62 Barzen (1999) 18.
63 Pätzold (1938) 353; Barzen (1999) 19.
64 Stölzel (1885) 151.
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and substantive law.65 To him the judicial reform was rather to revolve around changes
on the staﬀ level, namely the introduction of new criteria for the appointment of judges
and the approval of advocates.66 For decades, the king had attributed the shortcomings
of criminal proceedings to personal failure on the side of the judiciary staﬀ rather than
to any deﬁcit of the underlying laws.67 In the end, it was Carmer who initiated the
codiﬁcation, not the king.68 Carmer was opposed to the idea of limiting reform to the
staﬀ level from the very beginning.69 Finally, he succeeded in convincing Frederick II.
that a general review of procedural and substantive law was necessary.70 On 14 April 1780
the king issued the cabinet order putting Carmer in charge of implementing a general
reform of the legal system.71
The ﬁrst step of the new minister of justice’s legislative work was the reform of civil
law proceedings.72 As for the planned reform of substantive law, the cabinet order issued
on 14 April 1780 included plans to create codes of provincial law as well as a general
code of law for the Prussian states. The latter was to be a subsidiary to the codes of
provincial law and hence to be applied only in cases of loopholes in those codes.73 This
measure was meant to harmonise the legislations of the diﬀerent Prussian states without
altogether eliminating state and provincial legislations.74 Economy of procedure was one
of the aims of all those reforms, but in addition to that they were also meant to satisfy
the needs of non-jurists in search of legal protection:75 First of all, the laws were to
be written in German and free of any artiﬁcial Latin terms, making it easier for the
subjects to understand them; secondly, the new simpliﬁed language as well as enhanced
completeness of the legal rules was meant to diminish the number of disputes and legal
proceedings as a whole.76 The aim was not necessarily to create a new body of laws, but
merely to compile and revise existing laws.77 According to the cabinet order of 14 April
1780, the task consisted in collecting the hitherto existing legal rules, which stemmed
mainly from the roman tradition, measuring them against the standards of natural law
and adapting them to the characteristics of society at the time.78
Svarez, who had accompanied Carmer to Berlin as a member of his staﬀ, co-authored
the ﬁrst draft of the codiﬁcation of Prussian civil law,79 which was published during the
65 See Barzen (1999) 19.
66 Schmidt (1926) 27.
67 Krause (1998) 149.
68 Karst (2003) 185.
69 Bornhak (1903) 260.
70 Schmidt (1926) 27.
71 Frederick II., cabinet order (14 April 1780), in: Hattenhauer (1996) 37 et seq. – See Hucko (1994)
1449-1450; Birtsch (1969) 269.
72 Schmidt (1926) 27-28; Conrad (1965) 3; Conrad (1958) 16; Thieme (1965/66) 5-6.
73 Frederick II., cabinet order (14 April 1780), in: Hattenhauer (1996) 39-40. – See Thieme (1965/66) 7;
Barzen (1999) 23.
74 Frederick II., cabinet order (14 April 1780), in: Hattenhauer (1996) 39-40. – See Conrad (1958) 13-14.
75 See Conrad (1965) 3.
76 See Schreiber (1976) 86; Geus (2002) 116.
77 See Hattenhauer (1988) 43.
78 Schreiber (1976) 86; Hattenhauer (1996) 8-9; see Hucko (1994) 1449-1450; see Benthaus (1996) 49.
79 Bornemann (1842 / 1987) 8; Hattenhauer (1996) 9; Merten (1986) 59.
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period from 1784 to 1788.80 Meanwhile, the Prussian and German educated public were
also involved in the legislative process (external experts were asked for advice and an
academic contest was held).81 During the phase of public involvement, Frederick the
Great passed away (17 August 1786).82 He had promised in the cabinet order of 14
April 1780 to protect Carmer and his staﬀ against any possible rejection of their plans.83
Following the king’s death and Frederick William II.’s accession to power, however, their
position was less than certain. Carmer and Svarez had enjoyed the late king’s trust since
Frederick II. had been fully convinced of the philosophy of Enlightenment and the need to
transfer those ideas into legal reality. Frederick William II. can instead be characterised
as a monarch who was far less enthusiastic about Enlightenment.84
At ﬁrst, however, the process of codiﬁcation continued. Starting in the summer of
1787, Carmer’s staﬀ began evaluating the results of the public’s participation.85 Svarez
delivered his opinion on the reports handed in in his so-called revisio monitorum.86 On
the basis of that work, the draft was revised until the spring of 1791.87 The revised work
was called “Allgemeines Gesetzbuch für die Preußischen Staaten” and was published
after having been patented on 20 March 1791.88 It was planned to enter into force on
1 June 179289, but history took a diﬀerent turn. Through a cabinet order issued on
18 April 1792 Frederick William II. imposed the suspension of the code.90 He justiﬁed
his decision by referring to objections voiced by the Silesian minister of justice Albrecht
Leopold, Carmer’s successor in Breslau.91 On 9 April 1792, Danckelmann had submitted
a promemoria advising the king to suspend the code for an indeterminate period of time,
arguing mainly that the Prussian general public had not had suﬃcient time to become
acquainted with its content.92
At the time, the suspension by the king was possibly interpreted as the deﬁnite failure
of the whole project that had brought about the AGB,93 however, the king – as well as
Danckelmann – did most probably not intend to deﬁnitely abrogate the code of laws. The
fact that the suspension ordered by Frederick William II. was not limited to a certain
period of time makes thinking of it as a mere pretext seem rather implausible. It suggests
80 Schwennicke (1994) 457. – See Bussi (1966) 47; Barzen (1999) 58 et seq.; Gose (1988) 5.
81 For further information about the reasons for this change of the original plan and for involving the
public see Kuhli (2012) 147 et seq.
82 Wolf, (1963) 447.
83 Frederick II., cabinet order (14 April 1780), in: Hattenhauer (1996) 41.
84 Hattenhauer (1996) 10.
85 Schwennicke (1994) 457.
86 See Bornemann (1842/1987) 9; Krause (1998) 163-164; Hinschius (1889) 8; Willoweit (1998) 92.
87 Finkenauer (1996) 60.
88 Hattenhauer (1996) 10.
89 Publikationspatent (20 March 1791), preamble, in: Allgemeines Gesetzbuch für die Preussischen
Staaten, Erster Theil, Berlin 1791 (reprint: Frankfurt am Main 1985), p. VI.
90 Hattenhauer (1996) 14.
91 Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz (Berlin), Hauptabteilung I, Repositur 84, Abteilung
XVI, number 7, vol. 88, folium 10r. – See Stölzel (1885) 354.
92 Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz (Berlin), Hauptabteilung I, Repositur 84, Abteilung
XVI, number 7, vol. 88, folium 11r.
93 See Hattenhauer (1996) 14; Stölzel (1885) 355-356.
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rather that he was unable to estimate the amount of time it would take to communicate
the new laws as well as to apply certain corrective changes to the code which had even
been proposed by the Silesian minister of justice. Moreover, it is important to consider
the fact that in the spring of 1792 the king was faced with more urgent problems than
putting the code into force:94 Ever since 1791, Prussia was on the verge of being involved
in a war with France – a war which actually broke out only a few days after the cabinet
order of 18 April 1792 was issued.95 Hence, a number of facts indicate that for Frederick
William II. the reform of the Prussian judicial system was not a priority in the spring of
1792, which is why he did not object to the idea of postponing the entering into force
of the AGB. There is certainly no evidence that the king’s aim was to undermine the
project of codiﬁcation as a whole. Nor are there any grounds for the assumption that
Frederick William II. might have been acting under the inﬂuence of other political forces
(such as his companions Johann Rudolf von Bischoﬀwerder or Johann Christoph Wöllner
for example).96
The reformists reacted immediately to the order of suspension,97 but at ﬁrst Frederick
William II. insisted on his decision.98 The fact that the project was reverted to relatively
soon is, among other things, due to the second polish partition, which was agreed between
Prussia, Austria and Russia in January 1793.99 The partition of Poland entailed an
expansion of the Prussian dominion,100 which in turn lead to the Hohenzollern monarchy
being in doubt as to which laws the Prussian judges and civil servants were to apply in
the newly annexed province of Southern Prussia.101 When the AGB became a possible
alternative in this scenario, Carmer and his staﬀ saw a fresh opportunity to advocate for
the application of their work in the whole of Prussia. After a long period of discussion,102
Frederick William II. ﬁnally issued a royal cabinet order on 17 November 1793, assigning
Carmer with the task of applying certain modiﬁcations to the code of law and ﬁnding
a new title for it.103 According to the King, once those measures had been taken, the
code could enter into force in the whole of Prussia.104 After the ﬁnal review, which
was mainly carried out by Svarez,105 was completed on 4 January 1794, the code was
patented and promulgated on 5 February 1794 with the title “Allgemeines Landrecht für
94 See Bringmann (2001) 246; Meier (2007) 129.
95 For further information on the foreign policy constellation at the time see Möller (1994) 542 et seq.
96 See Kuhli (2012) 160 et seq.
97 Voigt (1972) 145.
98 Frederick William II., cabinet order (5 May 1792) (Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz
[Berlin], Hauptabteilung I, Repositur 84, Abteilung XVI, number 7, vol. 88, folium 15r). – See Barzen
(1999) 247.
99 Boeck (1966) 65; Thieme (1965/66) 12; Schwennicke (1994) 457; Benthaus (1996) 92; Hinschius (1889)
9; Kleinheyer (2008) 431.
100 See Hoensch (1998) 167; Davies (2001) 279; Boockmann (1992) 330-331.
101 Hattenhauer (1996) 14-15.
102 See Kuhli (2012) 164 et seq.
103 Stölzel (1885) 380 et seq.
104 Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz (Berlin), Hauptabteilung I, Repositur 84, Abteilung
XVI, number 7, vol. 88, folium 45r-46r).
105 Schwennicke (1995) 86-87; Stölzel (1885) 394-395; Hattenhauer (1996) 15.
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die Preußischen Staaten”.106 On the basis of this patent, the essential elements of the
ALR entered into force on 1 June 1794.107
With its 19,000 articles this piece of legislation is one of the most extensive codes
of law of modern history.108 Its authors had had the intention of providing legal rules
for every possible circumstance that might become a matter of criminal proceedings in
any Prussian court or of a legal dispute between subjects.109 The ALR did not cover
procedural law, since that ﬁeld was regulated in a separate set of laws. Instead, it
covered the ﬁelds of mercantile law, company and labour law, inheritance and family
law, municipal, industrial and building law, civil service law, feudal law, canon law, and
criminal law.
3.2 The concepts of power and law in the Prussian code of laws
3.2.1 The concept of the AGB
The term “Gesetzbuch” (‘code of laws’) contained in the title of the AGB already suggests
that what was to be applied was not the law in its deﬁnition as the sum of all existing
legal norms, but rather the single laws, i.e. the legal rules representing the formalised will
of the state.110 Therefore, each ﬁeld of law – after a period of three years even provincial
law111 – was to be codiﬁed in single legal rules. Accordingly, the AGB stipulated the
ultimate abrogation of customary law.112 In a very prominent position, namely in the
very beginning of the code, in § 1 of the introduction to the AGB with regard to the
rights and duties of the citizens of the state, reference is made only to the rules stated
in the AGB or in special codes of law. Moreover, the room for interpretation oﬀered to
judges and academics was to be reduced.113 In cases in which the scope of a certain legal
rule was not clear, the only body authorised to determine its applicability was to be the
Prussian Gesetzkommission (§§ 50, 51 of the introduction to the AGB).114
Thus, the concept underlying the AGB included the rejection of traditional law as it
had been in force in the Prussian states up to that date as well as an opposition to the
authority of the judiciary to interpret the rules in diﬀerent ways. This conclusion raises
the question of whether the AGB did indeed impose certain limits to the monarch himself,
106 Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz (Berlin), Hauptabteilung I, Repositur 84, Abteilung
XVI, number 7, vol. 88, folium 193r.
107 In the newly annexed province of Southern Prussia, the Allgemeines Landrecht even entered into force
at an earlier date since there was a lack of existing legal rules in that area at the time (see Köbler
[1996] 140).
108 Schwennicke (1994) 456.
109 Lancizolle (1846) 46 et seq.
110 Hattenhauer (1988) 46-47.
111 Publikationspatent (20 March 1791), in: Allgemeines Gesetzbuch für die Preussischen Staaten, Erster
Theil, Berlin 1791 (reprint: Frankfurt am Main 1985), p. VIII.
112 Hattenhauer (1988) 48, 65.
113 See ibid. 65.
114 See “Vorläuﬁge Instruction für die zu etablirende Gesetz Commission” (Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußis-
cher Kulturbesitz [Berlin], Hauptabteilung I, Repositur 84, Abteilung XVI, number 1, vol. 1, folium
13r-16v); Frederick II., cabinet order (14 April 1780), in: Hattenhauer (1996) 40.
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for in order to regulate the lives of the subjects there might well have been a need to
codify certain rules that regarded the monarch as well. That was the case with § 6 of the
introduction to the AGB for example,115 which has been widely discussed by scholars.
It stipulated rules about the eﬀects of Machtsprüche spoken by the monarch, and was
deleted during the ﬁnal review. More precisely, it stipulated that no rights and no duties
arose from Machtsprüche that were spoken during an on-going legal proceeding. The
rule explicitly referred only to civil law proceedings and hence did not apply to criminal
or disciplinary proceedings.116
Declaring Machtsprüche to be of non-binding nature as § 6 did was a programmatic
act against such interventions in on-going legal disputes by the monarch. However, the
provision does not equal a prohibition of Machtsprüche.117 In this respect, Svarez’ views
on the duty of the judiciary and the parties involved in a legal proceeding to obey any
Machtspruch, as laid down in the Crown Prince Lectures, must be referred to. Here, the
reformist states clearly that the respective judge or party to the proceedings shall have
no right to defy the Machtspruch.118 This idea was to hold true in reality even according
to § 6 of the introduction to the AGB, which can be deduced from the fact that the
introduction to the AGB does not comprise any provision to be applied in the case of a
Machtspruch being spoken by the king in violation of § 6.
There is thus evidence that § 6 of the introduction to the AGB was not meant to
represent a departure from Svarez’ theoretical concept according to which the court
was under the obligation of obeying the king’s Machtspruch. The court did, however,
have the possibility of submitting a motion of reconsideration and hence suggesting to
the monarch to annul his Machtspruch. If the monarch did not decide to do so, the
Machtspruch remained binding.119 In that case, the respective party was de facto forced
to wait for the Prussian throne to be passed on to the monarch’s successor and to resubmit
their motion of reconsideration to the new king.120 Hence, neither the king nor the courts
were the actual addressees of § 6 of the introduction to the AGB.121 It seems as if the
provision was meant to advise the litigant against submitting a petition to the monarch
in the ﬁrst place. Machtsprüche were undesirable but not ultimately forbidden.122 What
would have been in the spirit of § 6 instead was probably to some extent a voluntary
renunciation of Machtsprüche on the king’s behalf. From this perspective, the provision
is certainly in line with Frederick II.’s views expressed in his political testaments written
in 1752 and 1768.123
115 See Willoweit (1998) 101-102.
116 Finkenauer (1996) 83, 101 et seq.; Schwennicke (1994) 460; Conrad (1961) 25; Conrad (1965) 16 et
seq.
117 Schwennicke (1993) 137 et seq.
118 Svarez, Crown Prince Lectures, in: Conrad/Kleinheyer (1960) 238.
119 Schwennicke (1993) 158; Stölzel (1885) 309 et seq.
120 Svarez, extractus monitorum (Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz [Berlin], Haupt-
abteilung I, Repositur 84, Abteilung XVI, number 7, vol. 72, folium 20r); Stölzel (1885) 309 et
seq.
121 See Krause (1998) 189.
122 Finkenauer (1996) 103, 108.
123 See Kuhli (2012) 202 et seq.
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The same holds true for § 12 and § 79 of the introduction to the AGB respectively,
both of which were deleted from the code during the ﬁnal review, just as §6.124 §12
stipulated that the Gesetzkommission was to participate in the legislative process, and
§ 79 laid down that all laws had to contribute to the purpose of the state. Just as
from § 6, no legal obligation for the king arose from §12 and §79. Ultimately, all AGB
provisions that might have limited the king’s authority merely suggest possible limitations
on political or moral grounds. §6, §12 and § 79 could only be enforced by the monarch
himself, since the AGB did not provide for any external and independent institution
with the authority to supervise the king to such an extent. As long as the monarch
did not pronounce an opinion on the validity of a certain provision, each act of royal
authority would suggest that he deemed the respective provision valid. The king’s will
still represented the ultimate grounds for the validity of the law. The authority to enact
laws remained with the king despite the new code.125 At the same time, due to its
non-binding nature, the AGB cannot be called a constitution in the post-revolutionary
sense.126 Thus, Conrad’s view, according to which § 6, § 12 and § 79 of the introduction
to the AGB can be called a catalogue of fundamental rights (“Grundrechtskatalog”),127
cannot be subscribed to either. A code that could have been annulled by the monarch
easily at any time, did not oﬀer any room for fundamental rights directed against the
monarch.128 During the age of Absolutism – even Enlightened Absolutism –, no rules
could be developed which would subject the monarch to any legal duty. Such rules only
became accepted in constitutional monarchy.
At the same time, however, the eﬀect of the public promulgation of political duties
must not be underestimated.129 With provisions such as § 6, § 12 and § 79 of the
introduction to the AGB, the code constituted a publicly available document of the self-
discipline of monarchical power130 and hence it increased the political pressure to fulﬁl
those duties.131 After all, the AGB does in its provisions lay out certain guidelines for the
king’s actions. The provisions reﬂect the basic principles about right and wrong, which
according to Svarez constitute a veritable fortress for the citizens’ civil liberties.132 Even
if those principles about right and wrong had no direct legal implications for the current
monarch’s actions, from the perspective of the Prussian subjects hope remained that one
of his successors would put them into eﬀect.
The provisions that publicly documented the monarch’s self-discipline, however, were
not the only aspect of the AGB that functioned as guidelines for the king’s actions. The
124 Ibid. 219 et seq.
125 Hattenhauer (1996) 17.
126 Link (1998) 45; Finkenauer (1996) 128. – Diﬀerent view: Tocqueville (1998) 317; Philippson (1882)
56; Thieme (1937) 385 et seq.; Thieme (1967) 161; Conrad (1965) 6 et seq.; Merten (1986) 62-63.
127 Conrad (1961) 26.
128 For this reason, Fehrenbach’s view is to be rejected. According to her, the AGB and ALR represented
a ﬁrst guarantee of the fundamental rights of civil liberties and equality (Fehrenbach [2001] 55).
129 See Link (1998) 37.
130 See Birtsch (1985) 92-93.
131 See Finkenauer (1996) 135.
132 Svarez, Lecture “Über den Einﬂuss der Gesetzgebung in die Aufklärung”, in: Conrad/Kleinheyer (1960)
636.
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code also provided for certain institutions to act as advisors to the king in matters of
legislation. In his Crown Prince Lectures, for example, Svarez refers to the Gesetzkom-
mission as the unpartisan voice of truth.133 Accordingly, the high-ranking Prussian civil
servants were to support the king with their knowledge and skills not only in drawing up
the judicial reform itself, i.e. in compiling the new Prussian code of laws. In addition to
that, they were also meant to be given the opportunity to advise the king on any future
amendment of the AGB (or of the ALR respectively).134 The estates of the country
in turn were not conceded an advisory function comparable to that of the Gesetzkom-
mission. Although it is true that in the Crown Prince Lectures Svarez had stressed the
advisory function of the estates of the countries towards the king,135 in political practice
they did not have any general consultative right on the legislature concerning the whole
of Prussia even at that time (1792/1793). The AGB merely codiﬁed the rights of the
estates of the country in that it stipulated their role as local authorities.136 They were
not an oﬃcial advisory body to the king.
As for the role of the subjects, however, the AGB explicitly stressed their consultative
function. It is true that they were not meant to participate actively in the exertion of
state power.137 Furthermore, the 1791 code of laws includes the prohibition of fomenting
public unrest by mocking the laws – and a threat of punishment for those who act in
violation of this provision (§ 151 of the 20th title of the second part of the AGB).138 At
the same time, however, the AGB provided for the possibility of single subjects either
voicing objections to existing legal rules or other royal orders to the king or the leader
of a department, or of submitting suggestions for improvement in general (§ 156 of the
20th title of the second part of the AGB). Hence, public participation in assessing and
amending the laws was permitted – though certainly to a limited extent – in the name
of general welfare. This measure did not, of course, aim at creating a general public
discourse. The power of acting as an advisory body was to remain with the public
authorities. It must, however, be stressed that the subjects’ opinions were indeed taken
into account. This can be seen as a continuation of the tendency that had started with
the participation of the public in the legislative process that led to the creation of the
AGB in the ﬁrst place.
It can thus be concluded that the AGB does not reﬂect any intention of legally binding
the monarch to fulﬁl his duties. All of the legal rules that seem at ﬁrst sight to legally
subject the king to any duty – including §§ 6, 12 and 79 of the introduction to the AGB,
which were deleted in the course of the ﬁnal review – are void of any real legal prohibition
against him. The function of those provisions is rather the promulgation of the regent’s
political duties. Nevertheless, uncertainty remained from the perspective of the monarch
as to whether the provisions might possibly be misinterpreted by third persons. In this
133 Svarez, Crown Prince Lectures, in: Conrad/Kleinheyer (1960) 480.
134 Link (1998) 36-37; see Schwennicke (1993) 287.
135 Svarez, Crown Prince Lectures, in: Conrad/Kleinheyer (1960) 479 et seq.
136 Schwennicke (1998) 122; Bornhak (1903) 275 et seq.
137 Conrad (1965) 26.
138 See Svarez, Lecture “Vorschläge zu Censur Gesetzen” (Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin Preußischer Kul-
turbesitz, Handschriftenabteilung, Manuscripta borussica, vol. 443, folium 272r-277v).
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context, the ﬁnal review, which the three articles mentioned above fell prey to, is of
interest, and it shall thus be discussed in the following section.
3.2.2 The relevance of the ﬁnal review
As a result of the ﬁnal review, which had been ordered by Frederick William II., certain
signiﬁcant changes were applied to the Prussian code of laws distinguishing it from the
AGB.139 The most obvious one was the modiﬁcation of the code’s title (“Allgemeines
Landrecht für die Preußischen Staaten”). The deletion of § 6, § 12 and § 79 of the
introduction to the AGB was another important result of the ﬁnal review. Changes were
also applied to certain provisions that were not as fundamental, such as those concerning
morganatic marriage or inheritance law for poorhouses in cases in which the deceased was
unmarried.140 The latter modiﬁcations were of course of much less political importance
than the deletion of § 6, § 12 and § 79 of the introduction to the AGB. However, even the
elimination of those three provisions of the introduction did not mean that the general
legal concept underlying the Prussian code of laws suﬀered any fundamental change. This
is especially true for the ultimate deletion of § 6, the provision according to which the
king would renounce to speaking Machtsprüche. It has been explained above that this
provision did in no way run counter to Svarez’ theoretical concept, according to which
the court was obliged to obey any Machtspruch spoken by the monarch. According to
the AGB, royal Machtsprüche would have been undesirable but not forbidden. Hence,
Frederick William II. would not have faced any legal impediment to issuing such a dictum.
The same holds true for § 12 and § 79 of the introduction to the AGB,141 which is why
it can be aﬃrmed that the deletion of § 6, § 12 and § 79 would not have been necessary
from a legal perspective. All of these provisions, however, carried the inherent risk of
being interpreted in a much too extensive way or of being altogether misinterpreted by
third persons applying them at a later point in time. Since the provisions stipulated
the prospect of royal acts losing their binding nature as a possible consequence of their
violation, they might under certain circumstances have been misinterpreted to the eﬀect
that subjects or members of the judiciary were not obliged to obey when the King
issued a Machtspruch (§ 6), when a law was drawn up without participation of the
Gesetzkommission (§ 12) or when a provision excessively limited the subjects’ rights
(§79 of the introduction to the AGB). Apart from that, the three provisions bore a
certain potential of becoming central to large-scale reform eﬀorts.142 Therefore, the
reasons for the modiﬁcations applied in the course of the ﬁnal review were probably not
the actual content of the aﬀected provisions but rather their possible interpretation by
third persons.143
In this respect, the events that took place at the time in other European countries must
also be taken into consideration. The outbreak of the French revolution for instance
139 Geus (2002) 153-154.
140 Merten (1986) 62-63.
141 See Kuhli (2012) 236 et seq.
142 Reibstein (1962) 516-517.
143 Krause (1998) 132; Finkenauer (1996) 110-111.
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gave a clear picture of what Enlightenment could ultimately lead to.144 Against this
background, the Prussian view on many issues must have changed signiﬁcantly. In 1792,
the king did indeed receive a number of oﬃcial letters from certain estates of the country
and regional governments reporting unrest among the peasant population. Peasants had
allegedly declared that they were under no obligation to provide any services to their
landlords that were not required by the AGB.145 Given the events and background of
the French revolution, the authors of the Prussian code of laws might well have been
suspected of importing revolutionary ideas into Prussian society.146
When Frederick William’s conﬁdants began discussing the ﬁnal review, there was al-
ready a strong indication that the provisions of the AGB which were later deleted could
easily have been interpreted in a much broader sense than within what was originally
intended to be their scope of application. The Bavarian civil servant Johann Georg
Schlosser – one of Goethe’s brothers-in-law – for instance brought up the painful subject
in his paper published in 1789, in which he raised the question of whether the Macht-
spruch provision of the AGB meant that the party aﬀected had the right to resist in cases
in which the king acted in violation of that provision.147 Although it is true that from an
objective point of view, according to what has been established above, the answer would
have been in the negative, a judge might – just as Schlosser – not have been certain
as to how to interpret the respective provision. It was probably due to such examples
that the king grew increasingly concerned about the AGB creating incentives for further
reforms on a larger scale. Since such a risk was highest with regard to provisions that
were given a prominent position within the AGB – namely in the introduction – certain
provisions which had a similar content but were not as exposed within the text were
kept. For that reason, the Machtspruch provision of § 6 of the introduction to the AGB
was deleted while § 10 of the 13th title of the second part of the AGB/ALR was kept.
The latter provision stipulates that if a criminal oﬀender is pardoned by the king, that
does not mean that the victim of the crime loses their right to compensation under civil
law. Apparently, the risk of the members of the judiciary disobeying the king was not
deemed as high with regard to this provision as with regard to § 6 of the introduction to
the AGB.
It is hence apparent that § 6, § 12 and § 79 were deleted because they contained a
certain risk of misinterpretation rather than because of their actual legislative content.
This does not, however, justify drawing the conclusion that the ﬁnal revision did not entail
any substantial changes to the legal concept underlying the Prussian code of laws. The
fact that the deletion of the provisions mentioned above meant that certain substantial
political duties of the monarch were no longer laid down publicly plays a decisive role
here. As a result of the ﬁnal review, the need for the king to justify possible violations
144 Hucko (1994) 1450. – See Thieme (1965/66) 10; Koselleck (1981) 30; Albrecht (2005) 64; Merten
(1986) 61.
145 See for example Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz (Berlin), Hauptabteilung I, Repositur
84, Abteilung XVI, number 3, vol. 5, folium 87r-88v. – See Dilthey (1960) 149-150; Krause (1998)
176-177.
146 Schwennicke (1994) 457; Schwennicke (1993) 51 et seq.; Finkenauer (1996) 134.
147 Schlosser (1789) 175.
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of those duties to the public was reduced signiﬁcantly.
On the other hand, many of the reformists’ ideas did indeed persist even after the ﬁnal
review. For instance, the revised version of the Prussian code of laws still stipulated
the limited room for interpretation of the laws by the judges. Another concept that was
left untouched was the role attributed to civil servants and the subjects. Even under
the application of the ALR, the Gesetzkommission maintained its role as the institution
whose task it was to advise the monarch on issues regarding the legislative process. As far
as the Prussian subjects are concerned, Svarez had never aimed at their full participation
in the legislative process. He had always insisted in distinguishing between civil and
political liberties – he was only interested in achieving the former.148 The AGB did,
however, contain some substantial provisions regarding the freedom of thought that did
not fall prey to the ﬁnal review.149 One example is the right for each subject to publicly
voice possible doubts about or objections to any legal rule (§ 156 of the 20th title of
the second part of the ALR). Criticism by the subjects was hence allowed, a fact that
certainly had a normative eﬀect, since it could in certain cases mean that the regent was
under increased pressure to justify his actions. The right to voice public criticism was
certainly not individualised, but it was meant to serve an enlightened exercise of power by
the monarch. Furthermore, the fact that Svarez provided for the subjects’ right to voice
their objections reﬂects his fundamental concern with regard to the relation between free
people and the state.150 The codiﬁcation of this principle may well be one of the big
achievements of this extraordinary legal reformist.
4 Conclusion
Did Svarez’ ideas prevail then? The answer seems at ﬁrst sight to be a deﬁnite yes. The
considerations about the ﬁnal review not having lead to any fundamental changes of his
basic concept in particular seem to conﬁrm the assumption that the Prussian reformist
achieved his ends. However, there are some objections to be made to this view: If one
were to believe that the concerns Frederick William II. and his conﬁdants had about §§6,
12 and 79 of the introduction to the AGB – which were deleted in the course of the ﬁnal
review – becoming central to further large-scale reform eﬀorts were indeed justiﬁed, one
cannot rule out the possibility that Prussian history would have taken a diﬀerent turn if
it had not been for the ﬁnal review.
However, considerations about the hypothetical eﬀects of events in counterfactual his-
tory are usually vague and partly even futile. With regard to Svarez, the speculations
described above might even be completely erroneous, since they do in no way reﬂect the
reformist’s aims. Svarez was known to be a most dutiful civil servant, loyal not only
to his minister of justice, with whom he shared remarkably close bonds all throughout
his professional career, but also and especially to the Prussian monarchs. It is hence
148 Möller (1991) 116.
149 Krause (1998) 133.
150 See Svarez, Crown Prince Lectures, in: Conrad/Kleinheyer (1960) 219.
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improbable that he would have designed the Prussian code of laws with the idea in mind
of promoting attempts to constitutionalise the Prussian monarchy.
At the same time, however, Svarez’ undeniable dutifulness should not be misinterpreted
as meaning that the reformist was altogether opposed to any change in the Prussian po-
litical system. His loyalty towards the state and its regent must not be mistaken for an
uncritical attitude. As he mentioned in one of the Crown Prince Lectures, Svarez did
not shy away from voicing audacious truths (‘dreiste Wahrheiten’151) as long as he was
convinced that they were valid. However, one of these audacious truths was certainly the
publicly stipulated advice towards the king to renounce to issuing Machtsprüche. With-
out the ﬁnal review, the Prussian code of laws would have become a publicly available
document of the self-discipline of monarchical power and as such it would have made pos-
sible violations by the monarch of the duties he was subject to according to natural law
visible to all citizens of the Prussian states. As a consequence of the ﬁnal review, how-
ever, Svarez was denied the opportunity of inﬂuencing the monarch’s exertion of power.
Nevertheless, a number of his eﬀorts to point out the path of natural law to the king
were indeed successful. All in all, it may be true that Svarez’ work did not exactly make
him the one to bring about a new era in Prussian legal history – his great achievement,
however, lies in his systematic attempt of bringing about enlightened limitations to what
was at that time illimitable.
5 Bibliography
Albrecht, Matthias (2005): Die Methode der preußischen Richter in der Anwendung
des Preußischen Allgemeinen Landrechts von 1794. Eine Studie zum Gesetzesbegriﬀ
und zur Rechtsanwendung im späten Naturrecht (Eckert, Jörn [ed.]: Schriften zur
Preußischen Rechtsgeschichte, vol. 2), Frankfurt am Main 2005.
Barzen, Carola (1999): Die Entstehung des “Entwurf(s) eines allgemeinen Gesetzbuchs
für die Preußischen Staaten” von 1780 bis 1788, Konstanz 1999.
Benthaus, Raimund (1996): Eine “Sudeley”? – Das Allgemeine Landrecht für die
Preußischen Staaten von 1794 im Urteil seiner Zeit, Kiel 1996.
Birtsch, Günter (1969): Gesetzgebung und Repräsentation im späten Absolutismus.
Die Mitwirkung der preußischen Provinzialstände bei der Entstehung des Allgemeinen
Landrechts, in: HZ 208 (1969), p. 265-294.
Birtsch, Günter (1985): Carl Gottlieb Svarez. Mitbegründer des preußischen
Gesetzesstaates, in: Alter, Peter / Mommsen, Wolfgang J. / Nipperdey, Thomas
(eds.): Geschichte und politisches Handeln. Studien zu europäischen Denkern der
Neuzeit. Theodor Schieder zum Gedächtnis, Stuttgart 1985, p. 85-101.
Boeck, Dieter (1966): Die Schlußrevision des Allgemeinen Landrechts für die
preußischen Staaten von 1794. Vorgeschichte und Entstehung des Landrechts,
privatrechtliche Neuerungen anhand der Schlußrevision, geschichtliche Wirkungen und
Würdigungen, Hamburg 1966.
151 Ibid. 450.
Max Planck Institute for European Legal History Research Paper Series No. 2012-02Milan Kuhli 20
Boockmann, Hartmut (1992): Ostpreußen und Westpreußen (Deutsche Geschichte im
Osten Europas), Berlin 1992.
Bornemann, W[ilhelm] (1842/1987): Systematische Darstellung des Preußischen
Civilrechts mit Benutzung der Materialien des Allgemeinen Landrechts, vol. 1, 2nd ed.,
Berlin 1842 (reprint: Frankfurt am Main 1987).
Bornhak, Conrad (1903): Preußische Staats- und Rechtsgeschichte, Berlin 1903.
Bringmann, Wilhelm (2001): Preußen unter Friedrich Wilhelm II. (1786-1797),
Frankfurt am Main / Berlin / Bern / Bruxelles / New York / Oxford / Vienna 2001.
Bussi, Emilio (1966): Stato e amministrazione nel pensiero di Carl Gottlieb Svarez
precettore di Frederico Guglielmo III di Prussia, Milano 1966.
Conrad, Hermann (1958): Die geistigen Grundlagen des Allgemeinen Landrechts für
die preußischen Staaten von 1794 (Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Forschung des Landes
Nordrhein-Westfalen [ed.]: Geisteswissenschaften, vol. 77), Cologne / Opladen 1958.
Conrad, Hermann (1961): Rechtsstaatliche Bestrebungen im Absolutismus Preußens
und Österreichs am Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts (Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Forschung des
Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen [ed.]: Geisteswissenschaften, vol. 95), Cologne / Opladen
1961.
Conrad, Hermann (1965): Das Allgemeine Landrecht von 1794 als Grundgesetz des
friderizianischen Staates. Vortrag gehalten vor der Berliner Juristischen Gesellschaft am
25. Juni 1965 (Schriftenreihe der Juristischen Gesellschaft e.V. Berlin, vol. 22), Berlin
1965.
Conrad, Hermann / Kleinheyer, Gerd (eds.) (1960): Vorträge über Recht und Staat
von Carl Gottlieb Svarez (1746-1798) (Brandt, Leo [ed.]: Wissenschaftliche
Abhandlungen der Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Forschung des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen,
vol. 10), Cologne / Opladen 1960.
Davies, Norman (2001): Im Herzen Europas. Geschichte Polens, 2nd ed., Munich 2001.
Dilthey, Wilhelm (1960): Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 12: Zur preußischen Geschichte.
Schleiermachers politische Gesinnung und Wirksamkeit. Die Reorganisatoren des
preußischen Staates. Das Allgemeine Landrecht, 3rd ed., Stuttgart 1960.
Fehrenbach, Elisabeth (2001): Vom Ancien Regime zum Wiener Kongress
(Bleicken, Jochen / Gall, Lothar / Jakobs, Hermann [eds.]: Oldenbourg Grundriss
der Geschichte, vol. 12), 4th ed., Munich 2001.
Finkenauer, Thomas (1996): Vom Allgemeinen Gesetzbuch zum Allgemeinen
Landrecht – preußische Gesetzgebung in der Krise, in: ZRG (GA) 113 (1996), p. 40-216.
Geus, Elmar (2002): Mörder, Diebe, Räuber. Historische Betrachtung des deutschen
Strafrechts von der Carolina bis zum Reichsstrafgesetzbuch (Ebert, Christa /
Kittsteiner, Heinz Dieter / Knefelkamp, Ulrich [eds.]: Spektrum
Kulturwissenschaften, vol. 6), Berlin 2002.
Gose, Walther (1988): Entwurf, Gesetzbuch, Landrecht [1], in: Gose, Walther /
Krause, Peter (eds.): Aufklärung und Gesetzgebung. 200 Jahre Entwurf eines
Allgemeinen Gesetzbuchs für die Preußischen Staaten. Eine Dokumentation
(Ausstellungskataloge Trierer Bibliotheken Nr. 17), Trier 1988, p. 5.
Hattenhauer, Hans (1988): Preußens Richter und das Gesetz (1786-1814), in:
Hattenhauer, Hans / Landwehr, Götz (eds.): Das nachfriderizianische Preußen
Max Planck Institute for European Legal History Research Paper Series No. 2012-02Milan Kuhli 21
1786-1806. Rechtshistorisches Kolloquium. 11.-13. Juni 1987.
Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel (Motive-Texte-Materialien [MTM], vol. 46),
Heidelberg 1988, p. 37-65.
Hattenhauer, Hans (ed.) (1996): Allgemeines Landrecht für die Preußischen Staaten
von 1794, 3rd ed., Neuwied / Kriftel / Berlin 1996.
Hellmuth, Eckhart (1985): Naturrechtsphilosophie und bürokratischer Werthorizont.
Studien zur preußischen Geistes- und Sozialgeschichte des 18. Jahrhunderts
(Veröﬀentlichungen des Max-Planck-Instituts für Geschichte, vol. 78), Göttingen 1985.
Hellmuth, Eckhart (1998): Noch einmal: Freiheit und Eigentum. Zum
politisch-gesellschaftlichen Bewußtsein der Landrechtsautoren Carl Gottlieb Svarez und
Ernst Ferdinand Klein, in: Birtsch, Günter / Willoweit, Dietmar (eds.):
Reformabsolutismus und ständische Gesellschaft. Zweihundert Jahre Preußisches
Allgemeines Landrecht (Kunisch, Johannes [ed.]: Forschungen zur brandenburgischen
und preußischen Geschichte. Neue Folge, vol. 3), Berlin 1998, p. 63-89.
Hinschius, Paul (1889): Svarez, der Schöpfer des preussischen Landrechts und der
Entwurf eines bürgerlichen Gesetzbuches für das deutsche Reich. Rede bei Uebernahme
des Rectorats der Königlichen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität zu Berlin, gehalten am
15. October 1889, Berlin 1889.
Hintze, Otto (1915 / 1987): Die Hohenzollern und ihr Werk 1415-1915, Berlin 1915
(reprint: Hamburg / Berlin 1987).
Hoensch, Jörg K. (1998): Geschichte Polens, 3rd ed., Stuttgart 1998.
Hucko, Elmar (1994): Zum 200. Geburtstag des Allgemeinen Landrechts für die
Preußischen Staaten, in: NJW 1994, p. 1449-1453.
Karst, Thomas (2003): Der Einﬂuß von Carl Gottlieb Svarez auf die preußische
Gesetzgebung, in: ZRG (GA) 120 (2003), p. 180-199.
Kleinheyer, Gerd (2008): Carl Gottlieb Svarez (1746-1798), in: Kleinheyer, Gerd /
Schröder, Jan (eds.): Deutsche und Europäische Juristen aus neun Jahrhunderten.
Eine biographische Einführung in die Geschichte der Rechtswissenschaft, 5th ed.,
Heidelberg 2008, p. 428-433.
Köbler, Gerhard (1996): Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte. Ein systematischer Grundriß der
geschichtlichen Grundlagen des deutschen Rechts von den Indogermanen bis zur
Gegenwart, 5th ed., Munich 1996.
Koselleck, Reinhart (1981): Preußen zwischen Reform und Revolution. Allgemeines
Landrecht, Verwaltung und soziale Bewegung von 1791 bis 1848 (Conze, Werner [ed.]:
Industrielle Welt. Schriftenreihe des Arbeitskreises für moderne Sozialgeschichte, vol.
7), 3rd ed., Stuttgart 1981.
Krause, Peter (1988): Naturrecht und Kodiﬁkation, in: Krause, Peter (ed.):
Vernunftrecht und Rechtsreform (Aufklärung, vol. 3, 2), Hamburg 1988, p. 7-28.
Krause, Peter (1998): Die Überforderung des aufgeklärten Absolutismus Preußens
durch die Gesetzgebung. Zu den Hemmnissen auf dem Weg zum Allgemeinen
Landrecht, in: Birtsch, Günter / Willoweit, Dietmar (eds.): Reformabsolutismus
und ständische Gesellschaft. Zweihundert Jahre Preußisches Allgemeines Landrecht
(Kunisch, Johannes [ed.]: Forschungen zur brandenburgischen und preußischen
Geschichte. Neue Folge, vol 3), Berlin 1998, p. 131-211.
Max Planck Institute for European Legal History Research Paper Series No. 2012-02Milan Kuhli 22
Kuhli, Milan (2012): Carl Gottlieb Svarez und das Verhältnis von Herrschaft und
Recht im aufgeklärten Absolutismus. (Studien zur europäischen Rechtsgeschichte.
Veröﬀentlichungen des Max-Planck-Instituts für europäische Rechtsgeschichte Frankfurt
am Main 272), Frankfurt am Main 2012.
Lancizolle, Carl Wilhelm von (1846): Ueber Königthum und Landstände in Preußen,
Berlin 1846.
Link, Christoph (1986a): Anfänge des Rechtsstaatsgedankens in der deutschen
Staatsrechtslehre des 16. bis 18. Jahrhunderts, in: Schnur, Roman (ed.): Die Rolle der
Juristen bei der Entstehung des modernen Staates, Berlin 1986, p. 775-795.
Link, Christoph (1986b): Die Staatstheorie Christian Wolﬀs, in: Schneiders, Werner
(ed.): Christian Wolﬀ 1679-1754. Interpretationen zu seiner Philosophie und deren
Wirkung. Mit einer Biographie der Wolﬀ-Literatur (Deutsche Gesellschaft für die
Erforschung des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts [ed.]: Studien zum achtzehnten Jahrhundert,
vol. 4), 2nd ed., Hamburg 1986, p. 171-192.
Link, Christoph (1998): Aufgeklärtes Naturrecht und Gesetzgebung – vom
Systemgedanken zur Kodiﬁkation, in: Birtsch, Günter / Willoweit, Dietmar (eds.):
Reformabsolutismus und ständische Gesellschaft. Zweihundert Jahre Preußisches
Allgemeines Landrecht (Kunisch, Johannes [ed.]: Forschungen zur brandenburgischen
und preußischen Geschichte. Neue Folge, vol. 3), Berlin 1998, p. 21-46.
Meier, Brigitte (2007): Friedrich Wilhelm II. König von Preußen (1744-1797). Ein
Leben zwischen Rokoko und Revolution, Regensburg 2007.
Merten, Detlef (1986): Allgemeines Landrecht, in: Treue, Wilhelm (ed.): Preußens
großer König. Leben und Werk Friedrichs des Großen. Eine Ploetz-Biographie, Freiburg
i.Br. / Würzburg 1986, p. 56-69.
Merten, Detlef (1992): Die Justiz in den Politischen Testamenten
brandenburg-preußischer Souveräne, in: Bracher, Karl Dietrich / Mikat, Paul /
Repgen, Konrad / Schumacher, Martin / Schwarz, Hans-Peter (eds.): Staat und
Parteien. Festschrift für Rudolf Morsey zum 65. Geburtstag, Berlin 1992, p. 13-46.
Möller, Horst (1991): Preußische Aufklärungsgesellschaften und
Revolutionserfahrung, in: Büsch, Otto / Neugebauer-Wölk, Monika (eds.): Preußen
und die revolutionäre Herausforderung seit 1789 (Veröﬀentlichungen der Historischen
Kommission zu Berlin, vol. 78), Berlin / New York 1991, p. 103-117.
Möller, Horst (1994): Fürstenstaat oder Bürgernation. Deutschland 1763-1815
(Siedler Deutsche Geschichte), Sonderausgabe in der Reihe Siedler, Berlin 1994.
Ogris, Werner (1987): Friedrich der Große und das Recht, in: Hauser, Oswald (ed.):
Friedrich der Große in seiner Zeit (Neue Forschungen zur Brandenburg-Preußischen
Geschichte, vol. 8), Cologne / Vienna 1987, p. 47-92.
Pätzold, Erwin (1938): Johann Heinrich Casimir von Carmer, in: Gürtner, Franz
(ed.): 200 Jahre Dienst am Recht. Gedenkschrift aus Anlaß des 200jährigen
Gründungstages des Preußischen Justizministeriums, Berlin 1938, p. 331-366.
Philippson, Martin (1882): Geschichte des Preußischen Staatswesens vom Tode
Friedrichs des Großen bis zu den Freiheitskriegen, vol. 2, Leipzig 1882.
Reibstein, Ernst (1962): Allgemeines Staatsrecht und Völkerrecht bei Carl Gottlieb
Svarez. Zur Edition der „Kronprinzen-Vorträge“, in: ZaöRV 22 (1962), p. 509-539.
Max Planck Institute for European Legal History Research Paper Series No. 2012-02Milan Kuhli 23
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (2003): Vom Gesellschaftsvertrag Oder Grundsätze des
Staatsrechts (Hans Brockard [ed.]), Stuttgart 2003.
Schlosser, Johann Georg (1789): Briefe über die Gesetzgebung überhaupt, und den
Entwurf des preußischen Gesetzbuchs insbesondere, Frankfurt am Main 1789.
Schmidt, Eberhard (1926): Johann Heinrich Casimir von Carmer, in: Andreae,
Friedrich / Hippe, Max / Knötel, Paul / Schwarzer, Otfried (eds.): Schlesier des
18. u. 19. Jahrhunderts (Historische Kommission für Schlesien [ed.]: Schlesische
Lebensbilder, vol. 2), Breslau 1926, p. 22-29.
Schreiber, Hans-Ludwig (1976): Gesetz und Richter. Zur geschichtlichen Entwicklung
des Satzes nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege, Frankfurt am Main 1976.
Schwennicke, Andreas (1993): Die Entstehung der Einleitung des Preußischen
Allgemeinen Landrechts von 1794 (ius commune. Veröﬀentlichungen des
Max-Planck-Instituts für Europäische Rechtsgeschichte Frankfurt am Main.
Sonderhefte. Studien zur Europäischen Rechtsgeschichte, vol. 61), Frankfurt am Main
1993.
Schwennicke, Andreas (1994): Zwischen Tradition und Fortschritt – Zum
zweihundertsten Geburtstag des Preußischen Allgemeinen Landrechts von 1794, in: JuS
1994, p. 456-460.
Schwennicke, Andreas (1995): Die allgemeinen Strafrechtslehren im Allgemeinen
Landrecht für die Preußischen Staaten von 1794 und ihre Entwicklung in der
Rechtsprechung bis zum preußischen Strafgesetzbuch von 1851, in: Dölemeyer,
Barbara / Mohnhaupt, Heinz (eds.): 200 Jahre Allgemeines Landrecht für die
preußischen Staaten. Wirkungsgeschichte und internationaler Kontext (ius commune.
Veröﬀentlichungen des Max-Planck-Instituts für Europäische Rechtsgeschichte
Frankfurt am Main. Sonderhefte. Studien zur Europäischen Rechtsgeschichte, vol. 75),
Frankfurt am Main 1995, p. 79-104.
Schwennicke, Andreas (1998): Der Einﬂuß der Landstände auf die Regelungen des
Preußischen Allgemeinen Landrechts von 1794, in: Birtsch, Günter / Willoweit,
Dietmar (eds.): Reformabsolutismus und ständische Gesellschaft. Zweihundert Jahre
Preußisches Allgemeines Landrecht (Kunisch, Johannes [ed.]: Forschungen zur
brandenburgischen und preußischen Geschichte. Neue Folge, vol. 3), Berlin 1998, p.
113-129.
Stölzel, Adolf (1885): Carl Gottlieb Svarez. Ein Zeitbild aus der zweiten Hälfte des
achtzehnten Jahrhunderts, Berlin 1885.
Thieme, Hans (1937): Die preußische Kodiﬁkation. Privatrechtsgeschichtliche Studien
II, in: ZRG (GA) 57 (1937), p. 355-428.
Thieme, Hans (1965/66): Carl Gottlieb Svarez in Schlesien, Berlin und anderswo. Ein
Kapitel aus der schlesischen und preußischen Rechtsgeschichte, in: Erdsiek, Gerhard
(ed.): Juristen-Jahrbuch 6 (1965/66), p. 1-24.
Thieme, Hans (1967): Carl Gottlieb Svarez aus Schweidnitz (1746-1798). Der “größte
preußische Gesetzgeber”, in: Schulz, Eberhard G. (ed.): Leistung und Schicksal.
Abhandlungen und Berichte über die Deutschen im Osten, Cologne / Graz 1967, p.
157-163.
Max Planck Institute for European Legal History Research Paper Series No. 2012-02Milan Kuhli 24
Tocqueville, Alexis (1998) : L’ancien régime et la révolution, Préface, notes,
bibliographie, chronologie par Françoise Mélonio (GF Flammarion), Paris 1998.
Voigt, Alfred (1972): Gesetzgebung und Aufklärung in Preußen. Bemerkungen zum
Allgemeinen Landrecht für die Preußischen Staaten, in: Schoeps, Hans-Joachim (ed.):
Zeitgeist der Aufklärung (Kluxen, Kurt [ed.]: Sammlung Schöningh zur Geschichte
und Gegenwart), Paderborn 1972, p. 139-151.
Willoweit, Dietmar (1998): Die Revisio Monitorum des Carl Gottlieb Svarez, in:
Birtsch, Günter / Willoweit, Dietmar (eds.): Reformabsolutismus und ständische
Gesellschaft. Zweihundert Jahre Preußisches Allgemeines Landrecht (Kunisch,
Johannes [ed.]: Forschungen zur brandenburgischen und preußischen Geschichte. Neue
Folge, vol. 3), Berlin 1998, p. 91-112.
Wolf, Erik (1963): Große Rechtsdenker der deutschen Geistesgeschichte, 4th ed.,
Tübingen 1963.
Wolff, Christian (1740-1748 / 1968): Jus Naturae (1740-1748) (in: Ecole, J[ean] /
Hofmann, J[osef] E[hrenfried] / Thomann, M[arcel] / Arndt, H[ans] W[erner] [eds.]:
Christian Wolﬀ, Gesammelte Werke, II. Abteilung: Lateinische Schriften, vol. 24),
Hildesheim 1968.
Max Planck Institute for European Legal History Research Paper Series No. 2012-02